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1 Introduction
The size and productivity of firms differ widely across countries. In developing countries, the
business landscape is characterized by small, informal, and less productive firms, and few
large firms. Across Europe, small firms are more frequent in southern countries. Differences
in firm size and productivity have direct implications for aggregate total factor productivity,
output, and growth.1 On the other hand, at least since Lucas [1988], the idea that human
capital and education are important for economic growth has received a lot of attention.
However, the joint effects of differences in human capital on firm size distributions and
productivity and growth have received less attention.
We first investigate the link between education and firm size using data from two leading
surveys: the Enterprise survey and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey. We find
that average firm size is positively related to the percentage of workers with secondary
education rather than the share of college educated. This result is robust to the inclusion
of a variety of different controls regarding financial development or institutional quality.
We then propose a model where fewer educated individuals lead to a landscape of small
and unproductive firms. In particular, our model proposes a novel micro-channel by which
education affects productivity – the occupational choice of low educated individuals and
their managerial talent.
Figure 1 displays the intuition behind our model’s mechanism. Abstracting from the ar-
rows, the upper graph of the figure displays how a population is composed of primary (p),
secondary (s), and tertiary (t) educated individuals. The lower graph displays a probability
density distribution for the managerial talent (z) of the population. Three thresholds indi-
cate the managerial talent of the first individual to become an entrepreneur with primary
z∗,p, secondary z∗,s and tertiary z∗,t education respectively. Let us first consider a world in
which the distribution of managerial talent is the same for individuals of all three education
groups. If individuals with more education earn higher wages they face higher opportunity
costs of setting up their own firm, and hence the threshold for becoming an entrepreneur is
higher for tertiary educated individuals compared to secondary or primary educated. Ev-
erything else equal, a country with a larger share of primary educated individuals will have
a larger number of entrepreneurs with lower managerial ability and hence more small firms.
1See IDB [2010] or Lora et al. [2001] for evidence on firm size distributions in Latin America, and Davis
and Henrekson [1999] or Kumar et al. [2001] for firm size distributions in Europe. Braguinsky et al. [2011]
find that the shrinking size of firms in Portugal is linked to the country’s reduced aggregate productivity.
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Figure 1: Increase in educational attainment and occupational choices
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An increase in average educational attainment due to fewer primary and more secondary
and/or tertiary educated individuals, as depicted by the arrows in the upper graph, will
have two effects. On the one hand, there are more individuals who have a high threshold
for becoming an entrepreneur which increases average managerial talent. On the other
hand, as wages and profits change, managerial thresholds for all education groups may shift.
Arrows pointing to the left and right of the original thresholds indicate that they can move
either way, depending on the initial situation as well as on the magnitude of the change
in educational attainment. This second effect can potentially strengthen or weaken the
first effect. Furthermore, one can envision that workers with more education draw their
managerial ability from a better distribution which would amplify the positive effect of
education on firm size.
We set up a model to quantify these effects. Agents in our model economy are endowed
with an education level (primary, secondary, or tertiary) and a managerial ability. More
educated individuals draw their managerial ability from a better distribution. According to
their education and managerial ability, agents decide whether to become entrepreneurs or
workers. Production requires capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor, aggregated in a CES
production function, similar to Krusell et al. [2000]. Considering three education groups,
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we depart from the standard dichotomy of unskilled and skilled labor in the production
function. To reconcile the two approaches we assume the following setting. Workers with
primary education only carry out unskilled jobs. Workers with tertiary education perform
skilled jobs. Workers with secondary education can carry out unskilled jobs better than
workers with primary education but they also perform skilled jobs, albeit not as well as
college graduates.
We calibrate our model to match US current data and the time series of US college and
high-school premia. We follow the approach of existing literature and use Latin America
as a case study, comparing the United States and Mexico. Within our model, differences
in educational endowments between the two countries explain about 37% and 36% of the
differences in average firm size and GDP per capita respectively. Occupational choices, and
managerial talent that depends on an individual’s education amplify the effect of differences
in education on productivity and output. The GDP per capita difference in our model is 6
percent larger compared to the one generated in a model with a single representative firm.
Using educational attainment data for over 100 countries, our model is able to replicate
the empirical relationship between average firm size and educational attainment and, in
particular, the stronger relationship with the share of secondary educated individuals.
Our model also has time-series implications. Since the late 1970’s, average firm size in the
United States has stayed fairly constant, despite a strong increase in educational attainment.
The model is able to replicate this fact. The positive effect of education on firm size is
counteracted by the fall in the price of capital.
We then use our model to highlight the additional effects on firm size and productivity that
arise from a skill-bias in public employment. In our model educational attainment of the
population is exogenous. However, the number of educated workers and entrepreneurs in the
private sector is determined by how many individuals, and in particular skilled individuals
the public sector hires. Even for a given educational attainment of the population, firm size
and productivity can thus differ under different public employment scenarios. Our findings
regarding the effects of skill-biased public employment are in line with the discussion in
Hamermesh [1996] regarding its negative effects for economic development. We find that
firms’ input choices are altered towards less capital and skilled labor and towards more
unskilled workers. Moreover, public employment and its bias towards skilled workers actually
raises firm size. Because by hiring more workers, the public sector pushes wages up, affecting
occupational choices of the marginal entrepreneurs who before ran smaller firms and now
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chose paid employment.
Our paper mainly contributes to the literature on firm size distributions. Different from the
current paper, this literature tends to focus on frictions that cause deviations from efficient
firm size distributions. Cabral and Mata [2003] and Erosa [2001] argue that financial frictions
restrain the growth of firms.2 Hsieh and Klenow [2009] consider how distortions affecting
marginal products of labor and capital lead to a departure from an efficient firm size distri-
bution. Other explanations rely on policy aspects (e.g., Guner et al. [2008]) or institutions
(e.g., Grobovs˘ec [2013]). Antunes and Cavalcanti [2007] and Amaral and Quintin [2006] high-
light the role of informality for smaller average firms in Latin America. Empirical studies
suggest that these explanations are all relevant, with limited access to credit, labor market
regulations, corruption, and entry costs having a positive influence on informality, and a
negative influence on firm size (see Loayza [1997], Chong and Gradstein [2007], or Johnson
et al. [1998]).
We also contribute to the literature on public sector employment where most theoretical
papers proposes models with homogeneous workers and analyze crowding-out effects for pri-
vate sector employment and effects on wages; see e.g. Finn [1998] in an RBC model or
Gomes [2015] in a search and matching model. Albrecht et al. [2016] and Gomes [2016] who
both analyze how workers with different qualifications select themselves into the public and
private sector are among the few papers that consider potentially distinct effects across skill
groups. Prior to that Domeij and Ljungqvist [2006] pointed out that the expansion of the
Swedish public sector, that hired more low-skilled workers, was able to explain part of the
difference in the evolution of the skill premium between the United States and Sweden. Re-
garding outcomes, to the best of our knowledge Cavalcanti and Rodrigues dos Santos [2014]
is the only other paper that analyses how public employment affects occupational choices and
entrepreneurship. The authors propose a model where well paid public sector jobs distort
occupational choices of individuals as well as firms’ input choices, leading to sizable output
losses. In line with our results, the authors find that lower levels of public employment can
increase entrepreneurship.
Finally, there is a vast literature that studies the relationship between human capital and
aggregate growth and productivity; from classical works of Barro [1991] and Mankiw et
al. [1992] to more recent papers by Gennaioli et al. [2013] and Erosa et al. [2010].
Closest to the current paper are the works by Roys and Seshadri [2014] and Poschke [2014]
2See the survey by Buera et al. [2015] for additional references.
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that also consider how human capital affects both firm size distributions and productiv-
ity and growth. The former paper focuses on how occupational choice and human capital
accumulation decisions amplify the effect of education on firm size, productivity, and devel-
opment. Different from the current paper, the authors abstain from modeling capital-skill
complementarity and educational wage premia but focus on wage premia paid by larger
firms instead. Poschke [2014] presents exhaustive empirical evidence on the link between
firm size distributions and economic development, and proposes a model that is able to
replicate the empirical relationships. In his model most able entrepreneurs are in a better
position to exploit technological advances, and hence with development fewer individuals
become entrepreneurs, and they run larger firms.
To the best of our knowledge ours is the first paper to empirically establish the positive
and significant correlation of intermediate levels of education with average firm size and to
propose a model that is able to generate this relationship. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence on the relationship between
the educational level of a country’s workforce and average firm size. Section 3 describes the
model and Section 4 the calibration strategy. Then, Section 5 presents and discusses the
results. In Section 6 we conduct our policy experiments focusing on the skill bias in public
employment, after which Section 7 concludes.
2 Firm size distribution and educational attainment
We investigate the relationship between education and firm size using data from two sur-
veys: the World Bank Enterprise Survey and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey.
The Enterprise Survey has gathered data on 130,000 non-agricultural firms in 135 emerging
markets and developing economies since 2002. The survey only samples firms with five or
more employees. It collects information on the characteristics of the firm (at the plant-level)
and its business conditions. For a detailed description of the survey and its advantages see
Garc´ıa-Santana and Ramos [2015]. We construct the average firm size for each country,
using the variable “Average Number of Permanent, Full Time Workers”.
We also use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey. This survey is
conducted by the London Business School and Babson College, and it covers more than 50
countries. The GEM survey captures mainly small and informal firms. Hence, by focusing
on the left tail of the firm size distribution, it complements well the Enterprise survey. A
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Figure 2: Firm size and fraction of secondary educated population
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more detailed description of this survey can be found in Poschke [2014]; for a comparison
with other surveys see Garc´ıa-Santana and Ramos [2015]. From the GEM survey we use the
variable “average firm size,” calculated by Poschke [2014] for the period 2001–2005.
As our main exercise we run a cross-country regression of the log of average firm size on
educational attainment. We consider two measures of educational attainment: the share
of individuals with completed secondary education and some college, and the share of indi-
viduals with completed tertiary education (in %). Our data for educational attainment are
from Barro and Lee [2013]. In our baseline regression we include as controls the log of the
population and the log of GDP per capita taken from the Penn World Tables. The former
has been suggested as a proxy for the size of a country’s domestic market (see Kumar et
al. [2001]). GDP per capita on the other hand captures many other elements that potentially
correlate with firm size like financial development or the quality of institutions. Nevertheless,
we carry out extensive robustness checks where we include indicators for institutional quality
and variables related to financial development into our baseline regression. We also run our
regression without controlling for population size. These and other additional results as well
as summary statistics for all variables are displayed in Appendix I.
Figure 2 shows the unconditional correlation between average firm size (in logs) and the
fraction of the population with secondary education. We observe a strong positive correlation
in both surveys. Table 1 shows the results from our main regression. Column (1) presents
results when we only include the fraction of secondary and tertiary educated individuals.
In both surveys, only the coefficient on the former is significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 1: Average employment per firm and educational attainment
Enterprise survey GEM survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Secondary education 0.015*** 0.009** 0.011** 0.019*** 0.012** 0.014**
(3.12) (2.14) (2.28) (3.24) (2.29) (2.46)
Tertiary education 0.006 0.003 -0.013 0.006 -0.004 -0.013
(0.41) (0.25) (-0.85) (0.45) (-0.35) (-0.97)
Income per capita 0.201*** 0.282*** 0.219*** 0.323** 0.494*** 0.395***
(2.96) (4.20) (3.08) (2.58) (3.33) (2.71)
Population 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.142*** -0.375*** -0.537*** -0.438***
(3.50) (3.25) (3.59) (-3.17) (-3.92) (-3.24)
Observations 104 100 100 100 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.164 0.316 0.284 0.321 0.275 0.427 0.353 0.440
Notes: Data on educational attainment of the population over the age of 25 are from the Barro-Lee
dataset for 2005. Tertiary education refers to the fraction of the population that has a college degree.
Secondary education refers to the fraction of the population that has completed high school but does not
hold a college degree. Data on population and income per capita are from the Penn World Tables. For the
Enterprise survey, we compute the log of a country’s average firm size. For the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor survey, we use the log of a country’s average firm employment, as calculated by Poschke [2014].
The t-statistics are shown in brackets.*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance
at 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
In columns (2) and (3) we add the log of GDP per capita and population and, in turn,
each measure of educational attainment. Finally, column (4) presents results for the most
complete specification that includes all controls.
The R-squared measures indicate that differences in educational attainment can account for
16-28% of the variation in average firm size across countries. In particular, average firm size
turns out to be positively related to the fraction of the population that has completed sec-
ondary education, but not to the fraction of college graduates. The coefficient for the share
of secondary educated is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and has a similar
magnitude in both data sets – around 0.01. This implies that in a country where 65% of the
population have secondary education (e.g. Germany), average firm size is 27% larger com-
pared to a country with only 38% secondary educated (e.g. Italy). We also run a regression
of the dispersion in firm size (calculated using standard errors) on educational attainment;
see Table A12 in Appendix I. We find a positive correlation between the dispersion in firm
size and the fraction of secondary educated workers. This is in line with Poschke [2014] who
finds dispersion in firm size to increase with economic development.
As mentioned before, we confirm the robustness of our results along many different dimen-
sions. Two results are worth highlighting. When using a different sample that includes
OECD countries only, we estimate a positive and significant coefficient for the share of ter-
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tiary educated individuals but only when also controlling for secondary education. Hence,
for richer countries tertiary education also matters for firm size, but never independently of
secondary education. Second, when using average years of schooling and its square, instead
of the share of secondary and tertiary educated, we estimate a negative and significant co-
efficient for years squared which suggests a decreasing relationship between additional years
of education and average firm size. However, this last result is less robust because it is only
significant in one of our samples.
All our results hence point to the fact that average firm size is closely related to the pool
of workers with an intermediate level of education. A model for the relationship between
average firm size and human capital thus needs to differentiate between at least three levels
of education. Moreover, certifications like high-school diplomas or college degrees introduce
discontinuities into how markets reward labor services, something that is reflected in college
and high school wage premia and that a model with a continuous measure of education would
not be able to capture.
3 Model
We build a model with three levels of education. In our model economy a` la Lucas [1978]
there is a single representative household and a government. The household is made up of
a continuum of members with different levels of education e, with e = p, s, t. A fraction,
p, of individuals has primary education, a fraction, s, has completed secondary education,
and a fraction, t, has completed tertiary education, with p + s + t = 1. According to their
educational level and managerial abilities, household members become either workers or
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs produce a homogeneous good by using unskilled labor, skilled
labor, capital, and their ability as inputs. A household decides about levels of consumption
and savings, given the joint income of all household members.
Household The household maximizes the infinite sum of discounted utilities given by
∞∑
t=0
βtlog(Ct), (1)
where Ct denotes total household consumption at time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
The household’s total size is normalized to unity. Since we focus on steady states and for
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expositional clarity, we omit the time subscript, t, from the description of the model.
Endowments Each household member has one unit of productive time that he/she sup-
plies inelastically. Household members differ in their level of education e and managerial
ability, zi, distributed in Z = [0, z], and with cdf Fe(zi) and density fe(zi) depending on an
individual’s level of education. The household assigns occupations to its members depending
on their abilities and education. They can become either workers or entrepreneurs. Man-
agerial ability of the marginal entrepreneur of primary, secondary or tertiary education is
denoted by z∗,p, z∗,s, and z∗,t respectively.
Production Each entrepreneur, i, has access to the same technology, rents capital, and
hires different types of workers. Workers with primary education are hired as unskilled
workers, np,i, and workers with a university degree are hired as skilled labor, ht,i. Finally,
workers with a high school diploma can be hired for unskilled work, ns,i, or for skilled work,
hs,i. Firms produce a single good according to the following CES production function
yi = f(np,i, ns,i, hs,i, ht,i, ki) = Az
(1−γ)
i [µ(X
n
i )
σ + (1− µ)[λ(qki)ρ + (1− λ)(Xhi )ρ]
σ
ρ ]
γ
σ , (2)
where ρ and σ govern the elasticities of substitution between inputs. Total factor productivity
(TFP) is denoted by A, and q denotes the relative productivity of capital goods (or the
inverse of their relative price). The production function differs from Krusell et al. [2000] in
two main aspects. First, γ ∈ (0, 1) is the span-of-control parameter. The scale of production
is increasing in the enhanced span-of-control (i.e., the entrepreneur’s ability, zi). Second,
the unskilled and skilled labor inputs, Xni and X
h
i , respectively, are aggregations of workers
with different education levels, given by:
Xni = ((
nnp,i)
ψn + (ns,i)
ψn)
1
ψn (3)
Xhi = ((
hhs,i)
ψh + (ht,i)
ψh)
1
ψh , (4)
where 1/(1 − ψn) and 1/(1 − ψh) are the elasticities of substitution between workers with
different education levels within unskilled and skilled labor respectively. If ψn = 1 (ψh = 1)
then primary (secondary) and secondary (tertiary) educated workers are perfect substitutes
for carrying out unskilled (skilled) jobs. The parameter n indicates the productivity discount
for workers with primary education relative to those with a high school degree when carrying
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out unskilled jobs. Similarly, h reflects the productivity discount for workers with a high
school degree relative to university graduates performing skilled tasks.
Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs choose the number of workers, their education, and their
position as unskilled or skilled workers, and capital to maximize their firms’ profits. Given
the production function, they always choose a strictly positive amount of all inputs. Given
the wages per education level (wp, ws, wt) and a rental rate for capital (rk) the entrepreneur’s
problem is given by
max
{np,i,ns,i,hs,i,ht,i,ki}
pi(zi) = yi − wpnp,i − wsns,i − wshs,i − wtht,i − rki. (5)
The first-order conditions are:
fnp = w
p (6)
fns = f
′
hs = w
s (7)
fht = w
t (8)
fk = r. (9)
The entrepreneur equates the marginal productivity of each factor to its cost. Combining
the first-order conditions for labor, we can show that:
hs,i
ht,i
=
(
wt(h)ψ
h
ws
) 1
1−ψh
, (10)
np,i
ns,i
=
(
ws(n)ψ
n
wp
) 1
1−ψn
. (11)
Firms hire more workers with a high school degree for skilled positions if their productivity
discount is small, and if the college premium is high. For unskilled positions, firms hires
more workers with secondary education if the productivity discount for workers with only
primary education is high, and if the high school wage premium is low.
Notice that firms’ profits do not depend directly on the education of the manager, but only
on his/her managerial ability. A second aspect worth noticing is that all firms hire the
same skill mix, independently of their scale. The implication of this is that, in the model,
changes in educational attainment of the population only affect average firm size if the share
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of entrepreneurs in the economy is altered.
The Household’s problem The household chooses a level of consumption and savings,
and the optimal occupation for each household member, {C,K ′, z∗,p, z∗,s, z∗,t}, in order to
maximize the infinite sum of discounted utilities (Equation 1) subject to
C +K ′ = rK(1− τ) + (1− δ)K + (1− τ)[pwpFp(z∗,p) + swsFs(z∗,s) + twtFt(z∗,t) +
+t
∫ z
z∗,t
pi(zi, .)ft(z)dz + s
∫ z
z∗,s
pi(zi, .)fs(z)dz + p
∫ z
z∗,p
pi(zi, .)fp(z)dz],
where pi represents a firm’s before-tax profits. The household income includes the capital
income, the wage income, and the profits of its members who are entrepreneurs. All income
is taxed at rate τ . The solution to the household’s problem is characterized by the following
first-order conditions, evaluated at the steady state:
r =
1
(1− τ)(
1
β
− 1 + δ), (12)
wp = pi(z∗,p, .), (13)
ws = pi(z∗,s, .). (14)
wt = pi(z∗,t, .). (15)
Condition (12) is the standard Euler equation for optimal capital accumulation, which de-
termines the equilibrium interest rate. Conditions (13)–(15) are similar to Lucas’ [1978]
condition for the “marginal’ entrepreneur. Wage payments have to equal the profits indi-
viduals expect to make as entrepreneurs. Household members with primary, secondary, and
tertiary education, and managerial abilities z∗,p, z∗,s and z∗,t, respectively, are indifferent
between working or setting up a firm.
Government The government in this economy hires workers to produce the government
consumption good. It collects taxes on wages, profits, and capital income. The tax rate is
determined to balance the budget, given by
lg[twt + sws + pwp] = τ [rK + wpFp(z
∗,p)p+ wsFs(z∗,s)s+ wtFt(z∗,t)t+
p
∫ z
z?,p
pi(zi, .)fp(z)dz + s
∫ z
z?,s
pi(zi, ; )fs(z)dz + t
∫ z
z?,t
pi(zi, ; )ft(z)dz]. (16)
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The government chooses the level of public sector employment, lg, and hires workers of each
education level. Contrary to what we know from the data we assume that the public sector
hires the same proportion from each education group. We make this assumption to be able to
better isolate the model’s main mechanism. We relax it when conducting policy experiments
in Section 6. Wages paid by the government are equal to those paid in the private sector, a
common assumption in models with frictionless labor markets.3 Following the convention in
national accounts, government consumption in the model is measured at factor costs and is
given by the public sector wage bill g = lg[twt + sws + pwp].
Equilibrium In equilibrium, all five markets must clear: the three labor markets plus
the capital and goods markets. Denote the demand for primary, secondary, tertiary edu-
cated labor services, and capital by an entrepreneur with ability zi by np,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r),
ns,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r), hs,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r), ht,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r), and ki(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r), re-
spectively. For workers with primary education, the labor market clears when:
P ≡ Fp(z∗,p)p = plg + p
∫ z
z∗,p
np,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fp(z)dz + s
∫ z
z∗,s
np,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fs(z)dz
+t
∫ z
z∗,t
np,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)ft(z)dz. (17)
The aggregate supply of workers with primary education, P , must equal the sum of labor
demands by all entrepreneurs and the government. For workers with a secondary and tertiary
education, the labor markets clear when:
S ≡ Fs(z∗,s)s = slg + p
∫ z
z∗,p
ns,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fp(z)dz + p
∫ z
z∗,p
hs,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fp(z)dz
+s
∫ z
z∗,s
ns,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fs(z)dz + s
∫ z
z∗,s
hs,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fs(z)dz +
t
∫ z
z∗,t
ns,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)ft(z)dz + t
∫ z
z∗,t
hs,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)ft(z)dz (18)
3Empirical evidence indicates that wages in the public sector are higher than in the private sector, partic-
ularly for low-educated workers; see Gregory and Borland [1999]. In our model, given that the government
always hires an exogenous number of workers, a higher public sector wage would only affect the government’s
wage bill but not its ability to hire; see Gomes [2016] for a discussion on the effects of different public sector
wage premia in a model with search and matching frictions. Cavalcanti and Rodrigues dos Santos [2014]
study in detail the role of public sector wages on individuals’ occupational choices.
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and
T ≡ Ft(z∗,t)t = tlg + p
∫ z
z∗,p
ht,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fp(z)dz + s
∫ z
z∗,s
ht,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fs(z)dz
+t
∫ z
z∗,t
ht,i(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)ft(z)dz. (19)
The market clearing condition for capital is given by:
K = p
∫ z
z∗,p
ki(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fp(z)dz + s
∫ z
z∗,s
ki(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fs(z)dz
+t
∫ z
z∗,t
ki(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)ft(z)dz. (20)
With yi(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r) being the supply of goods by any entrepreneur of ability zi, for
market clearing in the goods market, we require
p
∫ z
z∗,p
yi(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)fp(z)dz + s
∫ z
z∗,s
yi(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)f s(z)dz
+ t
∫ z
z∗,t
yi(zi, w
p, ws, wt, r)f t(z)dz = C + δK. (21)
To calculate GDP, we add the government value added to private sector output such that
GDP = C+δK+g. We can now define a competitive equilibrium for the model economy in
steady state. Given a government policy {lg} and a sequence of prices for labor and capital
{wp, ws, wt, r}, a competitive equilibrium is a collection of thresholds {z∗,pz∗,s, z∗,t}, a tax
rate {τ}, and allocations {P, S, T,K ′, C}, such that:
1. {z∗,pz∗,s, z∗,t} solve the household’s problem (i.e., equations (13)–(15) hold);
2. the rental rate is determined by the Euler equation (12);
3. the five markets for goods, capital, primary, secondary, and tertiary educated labor
clear (i.e., equations (17)–(21) hold);
4. the tax rate, τ , balances the government’s budget (i.e., equation (16) holds).
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4 Calibration
Table 2 displays our chosen parameter values. We first set certain parameters exogenously,
based on available evidence. We fix the discount factor β to 0.96 and the depreciation rate,
δ, to 8%. Kydland and Prescott [1982] choose β to match a steady state interest rate of
4%. In equilibrium this rate plus the depreciation rate equals the marginal productivity
of capital, and hence given the capital share, the authors target the capital-output ratio.
Similarly, in our model both parameters together with the equilibrium tax rate determine
the before-tax gross steady state interest rate (see Equation 12). Firms choose the optimal
amount of capital such as to equate this interest rate to the marginal productivity of capital
(see Equation 9). Given parameters for the production function, and in particular λ, both
parameter values also determine the private capital-output ratio in our model.4
According to the OECD [2011], in 2008, public employment made up 14.6% of the US labor
force. In our benchmark case, we consider skill-neutral public employment, in the sense
that the government hires the same proportion of primary, secondary, and tertiary educated
as there are in the population. According to data from Barro and Lee [2013] in 2005, the
educational composition of the US population age 25 and above was as follows: 31.1%,
58.1%, and 10.9% had tertiary, secondary, and primary education respectively. For q, the
parameter for the relative productivity of capital goods, we use the inverse of the price of
investment relative to the price of consumption, taken from the FRED database. This ratio
is normalized to 1 for 2005.
The remaining parameters related to the distribution of abilities and the production function
are calibrated to minimize the distance between the model’s statistics and targets from US
data. Our calibration strategy proceeds in two steps. First we calibrate a slightly modi-
fied economy with only one unique distribution of managerial ability for all three education
groups and thus fewer parameters, see Table A13 in Appendix II. We then use the so-found
parameters as starting values for the calibration of our full model with three different distri-
butions for managerial ability. Even though in a general equilibrium model all parameters
affect all targets, we briefly discuss the data moments that each parameter is most likely to
determine.
We take as the empirical counterpart of a unit of production, establishments rather than
firms. We assume that managerial ability for entrepreneurs of each education group is dis-
4One can show that fk =
y
kΩ where Ω = γλ(qki)
ρ(
Az1−γi
y )
σ/γ [( y
Az1−γi
)σ/γ − µ(Xni )ρ]1−ρ/σ.
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Table 2: Baseline calibration
Parameters set exogenously Value Source
Discount factor (β) 0.960 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
Depreciation rate (δ) 0.080 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
Public employment (lg) 0.146 OECD
2000’s
Fraction of primary educated (p00) 0.109 Barro and Lee (2013)
Fraction of secondary educated (s00) 0.581 Barro and Lee (2013)
Fraction of tertiary educated (t00) 0.310 Barro and Lee (2013)
Inverse price of capital 2000’s (q00) 1 Normalization
TFP 2000’s (A00) 1 Normalization
1990’s
Fraction of primary educated 90’s (p90) 0.201 Barro and Lee (2013)
Fraction of secondary educated 90’s (s90) 0.533 Barro and Lee (2013)
Fraction of tertiary educated 90’s(t90) 0.266 Barro and Lee (2013)
Inverse price of capital 90’s (q90) 0.760 FRED Database
1970’s
Fraction of primary educated 70’s (p70) 0.379 Barro and Lee (2013)
Fraction of secondary educated 70’s (s70) 0.497 Barro and Lee (2013)
Fraction of tertiary educated 70’s(t70) 0.124 Barro and Lee (2013)
Inverse price of capital 70’s (q70) 0.510 FRED Database
Calibrated parameters Value Target
Distribution of ability
Shape parameter, tertiary (αt) 1.156 Mean establishment size,
Shape parameter, secondary (αs) 1.007 – entrepreneur secondary educated
Shape parameter, primary (αp) 0.967 – entrepreneur primary educated
Scale parameter (ξ) 0.112 Establishment share (< 10)
Location parameter (θ) 2.027 Establishment share (> 100)
Employment share (> 100)
Production function
Span-of-Control (γ) 0.857 Profit share
Weights
Unskilled labor in production (µ) 0.309 Labor share
Capital in Production (λ) 0.549 Capital-output ratio
Secondary educ. workers in skilled input (h) 0.613 College premium (2000)
Primary educ. workers in unskilled input (n) 0.756 High school premium (2000)
Substitutability
Within skilled jobs (ψh) 0.661 College and High school premia 90’s & 70’s
Within unskilled jobs (ψn) 0.667 College and High school premia 90’s & 70’s
Between capital and skilled labor (σ) 0.858 College and High school premia 90’s & 70’s
Between capital and unskilled labour (ρ) -1.120 College and High school premia 90’s & 70’s
Time series
TFP 90s (A90) 0.958 GDP per capita 90’s
TFP 70s (A70) 0.873 GDP per capita 70’s
tributed according to a generalized Pareto distribution – fe(z) =
1
ξ
(1 + αe
z−θ
ξ
)−(1/αe+1) –
with scale parameter ξ and location parameter θ. For each education group the distribution
is characterized by a different shape parameter αe with e = t, s, p. According to the Busi-
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ness Dynamic Statistics of the US Census, mean establishment size was 17.5. The shape
parameter αt for the distribution of tertiary educated is set to 1.16 to match this number.
The Survey of Business Owners (SBO 2007) has information about firm size and the educa-
tion of managers. We restrict our sample to firms with managers who are majority owners.
The average size of establishments with primary and secondary educated entrepreneurs was
equal to 50% and 83% of mean size. We set shape parameters αp and αs to 0.97 and 1.01
to target these numbers. According to the Business Dynamic Statistics of the US Census,
establishments with more than 100 employees make up 2.6% of all establishments. These
establishments account for 44.5% of all employment. Small establishments with fewer than
10 workers make up 70.4% of all establishments. Parameters, ξ and θ are calibrated to 0.11
and 2.03 respectively. Given that we have five parameters and six targets, we assign weight
5/6 to each of these targets.
We now turn to the parameters of the production function. The weight of capital in pro-
duction, λ, is set to 0.55 to target a private capital-output ratio of 2, as established for the
United States in Kamps [2006]. According to Goldin and Katz [2009], the college premium
in the 2000 Census was 61% and the high school premium was 31%. To match these num-
bers, the relative productivities of secondary to tertiary (h) and primary to secondary (n)
workers are calibrated to 0.61 and 0.76 respectively. Between 2005 and the second quarter
of 2007, the average wage compensation made up around 63% of GDP, and corporate profits
together with proprietors’ income were equal to 13.3% of GDP (Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis). These targets determine the weight of unskilled labor in production, µ, of 0.31 and the
span-of-control parameter, γ, of 0.86.
As our production function differs from those typically used in literature, we cannot match
the elasticities of substitution to existing empirical evidence. To calibrate parameters, ρ,
σ, ψn, and ψh governing the elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor
and between the three different levels of education, we introduce a time series dimension.
We target the evolution of the US college and high school premia at two additional points
in time: 1970’s and 1990’s. Between the 1970’s and the 2000’s, the share of tertiary and
secondary educated individuals increased considerably as did wage premia for both groups.
Similar to Krusell et al. [2000] we use the fall in the relative price of capital together with
skill-capital complementarity to replicate this feature in the data.
We thus simulate our economy for three periods (2000’s, 90’s, 70’s), adjusting the relative
price of capital, and the educational composition of the population for each decade. We
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also estimate relative TFP in the 1990’s and the 1970’s to target GDP per capita in these
decades relative to the 2000’s.
The quantitative predictions of our model depend very much on the elasticities of substitution
between the three inputs to production. Parameters ρ and σ, as well as ψn and ψh determine
these elasticities. We set parameters ψn and ψh to 0.67 and 0.66 respectively. Parameters
ρ and σ are set to -1.12 and 0.86. Our estimated values for ψn and ψh imply elasticities of
substitution of around 3 for secondary and primary educated in unskilled jobs and secondary
and tertiary educated in skilled jobs. Our parameter values for σ and ρ imply an elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor of 7 and 0.5 for the elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labor.
Our parameter values for σ and ρ are different from values in literature, in particular from
those in Krusell et al. [2000]. While our value for σ is quite similar to the one estimated
by Polgreen and Silos [2008] using NIPA data, our value for ρ is much smaller. This is due
to the fact that different from models typically used for estimating values of σ and ρ, our
model includes three educational groups. Due to the fact that in our model workers with
secondary education can carry out both, skilled and unskilled jobs, our production function
already has some “built-in” substitutability. This implies that as the price of capital and
thus low-skilled wages fall, in our model secondary educated workers can switch from doing
unskilled jobs to carrying out skilled jobs. This channel reduces the pressure on demand for
skilled labor and the rise in skill premia is weakened. Hence, compared to a model with only
two types of skills, our model requires more skill complementarity to be able to match the
observed rise in skill premia.5
Table 3 displays the calibration targets next to the model’s statistics, as well as some ad-
ditional moments that were not targeted. Our model matches the data well, including the
non-targeted moments. We somewhat overestimate the average size of firms run by tertiary
educated individuals but underestimate the fraction of large firms run by them. Once we
target average firm size, the self-employment rate in our model is determined. Targeting an
average establishment size of 17.46, together with a share of public employment of 14.6%
fixes the entrepreneurship rate in our model at 5% (1−0.146−e
e
= 17.46; e = 0.05). The model
thus underestimates the share of self-employed in the population of 7% as reported by the
5In Tables A18 to A20 in Appendix II, we present an alternative calibration with a very high elasticity
of substitution within skilled and unskilled jobs (ψn = ψh = 0.976). Such a calibration is unable to capture
the increase in high-school and college premia over time.
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Table 3: Calibration targets and model values
Targeted moments Source Data Model
Mean establishment US Census 17.46 17.57
Relative size establishment primary educated manager SBO(2007) 0.50 0.50
Relative size establishment secondary educated manager SBO(2007) 0.83 0.83
Establishment share, < 10 employees US Census 0.70 0.73
Establishment share, > 100 employees US Census 0.03 0.03
Employment share, > 100 employees US Census 0.45 0.45
Capital-output-ratio Kamps (2006) 2.00 1.99
Profits to GDP BEA 0.13 0.13
Wage bill BEA 0.63 0.63
College Premium 2000 Goldin and Katz 2009 0.61 0.61
College Premium 1990 Goldin and Katz 2009 0.55 0.54
College Premium 1970 Goldin and Katz 2009 0.47 0.46
High School Premium 2000 Goldin and Katz 2009 0.31 0.31
High School Premium 1990 Goldin and Katz 2009 0.28 0.29
High School Premium 1970 Goldin and Katz 2009 0.23 0.23
GDP per capita 1990’s relative to 2000’s BEA 0.82 0.82
GDP per capita 1970’s relative to 2000’s BEA 0.55 0.53
Non-targeted moments Source Data Model
Relative size establishment tertiary educated manager SBO(2007) 1.27 1.90
Employment share, < 10 employees US Census 0.15 0.19
Employment share, 20− 99 employees US Census 0.30 0.25
Establishment share, 20− 99 employees US Census 0.13 0.10
Fraction of large (> 100 employees) firms managed by
tertiary educated SBO(2007) 0.63 0.49
secondary educated SBO(2007) 0.35 0.44
primary educated SBO(2007) 0.02 0.06
Self-employment rate OECD 0.07 0.05
OECD.6
5 Education and firm size
We evaluate the predictive power of our model in a cross-country setting and along the US
time-series dimension. We start by adjusting the US current educational attainment to that
of Mexico to understand how the educational composition of the labor force affects average
firm size and productivity. We also replicate our empirical results from Section 2 by running
the model for a large number of countries, adjusting the educational composition of their
6The OECD statistic is also similar to the fraction of unincorporated self-employed over total employment
in the US of 6-7% as reported in Hipple [2010]. As the author points out, many data sources tend to count
incorporated self-employed as employees, potentially also our source for average establishment size. In this
case the most comparable rate to our model statistic is the fraction of unincorporated self-employed.
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populations, and looking at the model’s predictions for average firm size. Finally, we consider
the time-series implications of our model for the United States.
5.1 United States versus Mexico
To evaluate the impact of the supply of skilled labor on firm size and productivity, we com-
pare our benchmark economy to an identical economy that has the educational attainment
of Mexico. In particular, we run our benchmark economy for the 2000’s maintaining all pa-
rameters including the level of TFP from Table 3, only changing parameters t00, s00 and p00.
According to data from Barro and Lee [2013] in 2005, the educational composition of the
Mexican population age 25 and above was as follows: 9.1%, 16.0%, and 74.9% had tertiary,
secondary, and primary education respectively.
Table 4 displays the benchmark results for the United States next to those for Mexico. In
the last two columns we show the results from a representative firm model. The level of
education of the Mexican labor force is much lower than that of the US labor force. But
what does this imply for output and, in particular, for firm size and productivity?
In our model, the average firm size in Mexico is 13 - lower than in the US. In the data, the
average firm in Mexico has 5 workers (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa) [2014]).
Hence we can explain around 37% of the difference in average firm size. However, notice
that this number masks the two effects depicted in Figure 1. Holding all entrepreneurial
thresholds fixed at the US level, and hence assuming that in Mexico the same fraction of
individuals from each education group as in the US chooses to set up a firm, we can construct
a hypothetical measure for average firm size in Mexico. This is done by simply weighting
those fractions by the shares of primary, secondary, and tertiary educated in Mexico. Under
this assumption the average firm in Mexico would have 11 workers. However, profits and
wages change, and thus thresholds in Mexico are different. Regarding wages, because skilled
workers are much scarcer in Mexico, wages of secondary and tertiary educated are 36% and
21% higher, while wages of primary educated are 35.6% lower. On the other hand, and due to
higher skilled wages, profits across all levels of managerial ability are 36.2% lower. We hence
observe that all thresholds shift to the right, particularly for secondary and tertiary educated
individuals. This is why, conditional on educational attainment of the entrepreneur, firms
in Mexico are larger than in the US, particularly the average size of firms with a secondary
or tertiary educated manager is twice as large. Nevertheless, average firm size in Mexico is
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Table 4: Results: United States and Mexico
Statistic Baseline Model Representative firm
United States Mexico United States Mexico
Firm size distribution
Mean establishment size
Overall 17.57 12.95 - -
Entrepreneurs with primary education 8.74 10.35 - -
Entrepreneurs with secondary education 14.57 40.17 - -
Entrepreneurs with tertiary education 33.41 69.86 - -
Establishment share, < 10 employees 0.73 0.80 - -
Establishment share, > 100 employees 0.03 0.02 - -
Employment share, < 10 employees 0.19 0.24 - -
Employment share, 20− 99 employees 0.25 0.24 - -
Employment share, > 100 employees 0.45 0.40 - -
Fraction of large firms (> 100 employees) with
Primary educated manager 0.06 0.63 - -
Secondary educated manager 0.44 0.17 - -
Tertiary educated manager 0.49 0.20 - -
Dispersion in establishment size 108.0 100 - -
Entrepreneurship
Share of entrepreneurs 0.05 0.06 - -
Fraction of entrepreneurs with
Primary education 0.19 0.94 - -
Secondary education 0.60 0.04 - -
Tertiary education 0.22 0.02 - -
Threshold to become entrepreneur
Primary education 3.22 3.25 - -
Secondary education 4.22 8.96 - -
Tertiary education 6.81 12.93 - -
Aggregate variables
Private capital-output-ratio 1.99 1.06 1.99 1.02
Profits to GDP 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Wagebill 0.63 0.75 0.63 0.75
College premium 0.61 0.44 0.62 0.43
High-school premium 0.31 1.77 0.32 1.84
College premium of entrepreneurs 1.29 0.74 - -
High-school premium of entrepreneurs 0.67 2.88 - -
Private sector output per worker 181.9 100 180.8 100
GDP per capita 181.7 100 177.2 100
Output per Establishment 246.9 100 - -
Notes: For the representative firm model we use the parameter values for the production function from
our baseline economy.
lower because there are many low ability entrepreneurs who only have primary education:
94% of all firms and 63% of firms with more than 100 workers are run by primary educated
managers.
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The different educational wage premia in Mexico drive differences in firms’ input choices.
Mexican workers with a secondary education earn 177% more than primary educated workers.
The college wage premium is only 44% and thus lower than in the United States. These
numbers are in line with empirical evidence. According to Lo´pez-Acevedo [2001], workers
with a college degree in Mexico earn 53% more than those with an upper secondary education,
who in turn earn 70% more than those with primary education and 170% more than those
with no schooling. Note that our measure of primary educated also includes individuals
without schooling. As low-skilled labor is thus relatively cheap in Mexico firms substitute
capital by primary educated workers, which leads to a lower capital-output ratio. In line with
empirical findings for the US reviewed in van der Sluis, van Praag, and Vijverberg [2008],
education premia in our model are higher for entrepreneurs’ profits than for workers’ wages.
Furthermore, these differences are larger in the US compared to Mexico.
Productivity in Mexico is lower when comparing all measures. More individuals in Mexico
set up firms than in the United States, and more entrepreneurs lower the average managerial
talent. In addition, more entrepreneurs in Mexico are primary educated individuals which
leads to even lower average managerial talent. This is why, private output per worker and
GDP—the sum of private output and the government’s wage bill—are also lower.
In the last part of Table 4 we display aggregate statistics from our model for both countries
and compare them to those generated by a model with a representative firm. Similarly for
the representative firm model, parameters for the US and Mexico are assumed to be the
same, and we only adjust the distribution of education in each country. In our benchmark
model, higher educational attainment in the United States implies that GDP per capita is
82% higher than in Mexico, compared to a difference of 77% generated by a representative
firm model. Hence, taking into account the effect of education on the firm size distribution
amplifies by 6% the effects of education on GDP. In the data, the ratio of GDP per capita
US-Mexico is 3.23. Differences in educational attainment alone can hence account for 36%
of the difference in GDP per capita.
In line with our empirical findings, dispersion in establishment size is higher in the US than
in Mexico.
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Figure 3: Mean firm size and educational attainment in model
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Data: Educational Attainment: Barro-Lee dataset; Firm size: Model
5.2 Cross-country analysis
Using data on educational attainment from Barro and Lee [2013], we test how well the model
is able to replicate the positive cross-country relationship between educational attainment
and average firm size. We restrict our attention to countries that have at least 5 percent of
the population in each of the three educational categories, and we run our benchmark model
with all parameter values from Table 2, and we only change the share of primary, secondary
and tertiary educated individuals for each country.7
Figure 3 shows the positive relationship between secondary educational attainment and the
log of average firm size that arises from this exercise. The slope of the related regression
is 0.0044, compared to 0.01 in our empirical analysis in Section 2. This confirms that also
in our model, secondary education is closely related to average firm size. The R-squared is
0.63. Adding the fraction of those with tertiary education to the model’s regression of the
log of average firm size on secondary education marginally raises the R-squared to 0.64. This
suggests that also in our model for a large sample of countries tertiary education only has a
limited contribution for average firm size.
7A very small share of one educational group of workers implies that for this group marginal productivity
and wages skyrocket. To account for these cases, we would have to generalize the model such that all
workers could perform both skilled and unskilled jobs. In such a model, when there are very few secondary
and tertiary educated workers, workers with primary education might take over skilled jobs. Similarly, when
almost every worker has tertiary education some of them might perform unskilled jobs.
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5.3 United States Time Series
The time series simulation of our model provides additional predictions that can be con-
trasted with data. Table 5 shows the evolution of average firm size in the US and the one
predicted by the model. While during most of the 20th century average firm size in the US
increased, looking at comparable data from the US Census’s Business Dynamic Statistics
available since the late 1970’s, we do not observe any clear trend, with average establishment
size fluctuating around 17.
Table 5: Determinants of the evolution of firm size in the US
Year Data Model
Baseline Only changing education Only changing technology
(P , S and T ) (q and A)
1970 - 18.63 13.91 18.63
1975 - 18.07 14.72 17.92
1980 17.00 17.47 15.38 17.31
1985 16.59 17.03 15.65 16.29
1990 17.11 16.83 15.87 15.48
1995 16.87 16.69 16.36 14.60
2000 18.11 16.88 16.82 13.88
2005 17.47 17.57 17.57 13.91
2010 16.79 17.66 17.66 13.91
Notes: Data on average establishment size are from the US Census’ Business Dynamic Statistics available
since 1977. For the baseline case, we vary the education shares in the population, the relative price of
capital, and TFP estimated for three decades (2000’s, 90’s and 70’s). In the last two columns we change
in turn only the education shares and only the relative price of capital and TFP.
In our baseline model where we adjust education and technology over time, we also do not
detect any clear trend in average firm size. However, this result is the consequence of two
opposing forces that offset each other. The positive effect of education on firm size is coun-
teracted by the fall in the price of capital. In the third column of Table 5 we display results
when fixing technology at its 2005 values and only changing the educational attainment of
the population. Increasing education from its 1970’s level to today leads to an increase in
firm size by 26%. On the other hand, fixing the education level in the 1970’s and only
improving technology decreases average firm size by 34%.8 In the presence of capital-skill
complementarity, a reduction in the price of capital raises wages of secondary and tertiary
educated workers by more than profits, and hence fewer will become entrepreneurs. How-
ever, primary educated workers do not benefit as much, and given that profits increase,
their entrepreneurial thresholds fall and many will become entrepreneurs. In the 1970’s pri-
8See Table A14 in Appendix II for a similar table for the model with a unique talent distribution.
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mary educated individuals made up almost 40% of the population, and hence with constant
education shares the later effect dominates and average firm size falls (see last column).
6 The effects of public employment
The public sector is the largest employer in the economy, both in advanced and developing
economies. Behar and Mok [2013] report that, on average for 194 countries, public sector
employment accounts for 15% of total employment. Besides hiring a large fraction of the
labor force, the public sector displays a clear bias towards skilled workers, equally common
in both advanced and developing economies. Giordano et al. [2011] report that the average
share of workers with tertiary education is 2.6 times higher in the public than in the private
sector in Euro Area countries, ranging from 1.6 times in Belgium to 4.3 times in Portugal.
In the case of Latin America, Mizala et al. [2010] report that the average years of education
in the public sector are 3 to 6 years higher than in the private sector, while Panizza [2000]
finds the public sector to hire on average 30% of workers with at least secondary education.
Assaad [1998] describes an even larger skill bias in Egypt, where the government hired 70%
of females and more than 40% of males with a high school diploma or a university degree.9
In our model where educational attainment of the population is exogenous, public employ-
ment determines the number of educated workers and entrepreneurs in the private sector.
The framework of our model allows us to analyze both the impact of public employment as
well as the effect of skill-biased public employment for entrepreneurship, firm productivity,
and aggregate output. To guide the discussion, let us write the expression for average firm
size in a country as
firm size =
1−% public employment−% entrepreneurs
% entrepreneurs
. (22)
Increasing public employment has a direct negative effect on average firm size because given
a fixed number of firms, there are fewer workers available in the private sector. However,
the total effect on average firm size also depends on the effect on entrepreneurship.
Figure 4 shows how average firm size, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, and
GDP vary with the size of the public sector. Perhaps surprisingly, average firm size increases
9Note that contrary to our assumption, public employment in the US is also skill-biased. However, as we
show in Table A17 in Appendix II, taking into account the actual educational composition of the US public
sector has only minor effects on firm size.
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with the level of public sector employment. By hiring more workers, the public sector pushes
up all wages, affecting occupational choices of the marginal entrepreneurs who now chose
paid employment.
Regarding GDP, public employment only has a small impact. A 15 percentage point increase
in public employment reduces GDP by 2 and 4 percent in Mexico and the US respectively.
GDP includes government consumption which is essentially the government’s wage bill. As
the public sector expands, wages increase and so does government consumption, indepen-
dently of the productivity of public employees or the value of government services.
Figure 4: The effects of skill-neutral public employment
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Note: vertical line indicates the baseline calibration.
We now turn to the effects of skill-biased public employment. In this exercise we keep
the overall level of public employment at 14.6%, and we adjust the share of secondary
and tertiary educated public employees, compensating with a change in the public hiring
of primary educated workers. Figure 5 displays the results from this exercise. We find
that increases in the government’s wage bill via overall expansions of the public sector, or
via hiring more skilled workers who earn higher wages have similar effects. Hiring more
secondary or tertiary educated public employees raises firm size, reduces entrepreneurship,
and has a small but negative effect on GDP. In line with Hamermesh [1996], skill-biased
public employment alters firms’ input choices towards less capital and skilled labor and
towards more unskilled workers; see Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix II.
An expansion of the public sector has similar negative effects on GDP as a reduction in
educational attainment. Within a representative firm model both scenarios lead to similar
outcomes. However, within our model we are able to observe that effects on entrepreneurship
and average firm size point into opposite directions. Whereas more public employment
and skill-biased public employment lead to increases in average firm size, lower educational
attainment in a country is associated with smaller firms. This is due to the fact that while
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Figure 5: The effects of skill-biased public employment
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Note: vertical line indicates the baseline calibration. Increases (decreases) in the share of secondary or
tertiary educated public employees are obtained by reducing (increasing) the share of primary educated. The
low shares of primary educated workers in the US and secondary and tertiary educated workers in Mexico
place a lower and an upper bound on how many primary, secondary, and tertiary educated public sector
workers can be hired.
public employment affects wages and hence decisions of marginal entrepreneurs, it has little
effect on the overall managerial talent in an economy. Most entrepreneurs will not change
their occupational choice as the public sector expands. While the public sector tends to be
an absorber of skilled workers, contributing to the scarcity of skilled labor, it does not act as
an absorber of managerial talent. On the other hand, a reduction in educational attainment
lowers overall managerial talent.
7 Conclusion
Many alternative mechanisms have been proposed to explain why the business landscape in
developing countries is characterized by small and less productive firms and few large firms.
We find that, empirically, the educational attainment of a country’s population is positively
related to firm size, particularly the fraction of the population that has completed secondary
education. This finding is robust to the inclusion of a variety of financial and institutional
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controls which are related to other explanations why firms in some countries are smaller.
In our model economy, a more educated labor force raises firm size and productivity. More
educated workers earn higher wages, which leads to a more select group of entrepreneurs
among educated individuals. Calibrated to the United States, we find that within our model
differences in educational attainment alone have the potential to explain 37% and 36% of
the differences in Mexican and US average firm size and GDP per capita, respectively.
Empirical findings have suggested an important role for secondary education in reducing
income inequality (see Tilak [1989]). Our model proposes a micro mechanism of how a
larger fraction of individuals with secondary education can lead to higher output, lower
wage premia, and thus lower wage inequality. Regarding public hiring policies, we highlight
how their effect on average firm size depends on the adjustment in entrepreneurship. In
particular, we find that an increase in the public sector’s wage bill – due to an overall
expansion or a skill-bias in public employment – affects occupational choices of the marginal
entrepreneurs who now chose paid employment. Our model thus allows us to measure the
effects of public sector hiring that go beyond those already pointed out by previous studies,
such as queuing or changes in skill premia.
Our model takes the education attainment of the population as given, but has interesting
implications regarding incentives to accumulate human capital. For instance, we find that
education premia are higher for entrepreneurs than for workers, and that this differences is
larger in the US compared to Mexico. It would require a model with endogenous human
capital formation to address how much differences in wage and entrepreneurial education
premia can account for differences in educational attainment between the two countries.
This suggests that endogeneizing individuals’ human capital accumulation and in particular
examining the role of public sector employment on education, could be an interesting road
for future research.
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